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PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION, EQUAL COMPENSATION
AND THE GHOST OF GILBERT:
MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE
FOR SPOUSES OF EMPLOYEES
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of sex.' In 1972, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency charged with
enforcing Title VII, interpreted the sex discrimination prohibition to
bar discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.2 During the next four
years, eighteen federal district courts3 and six federal courts of ap-
peals 4 adhered to the EEOC's interpretation. Nonetheless, in General
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-200Oe-17 (1976). Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a) as amended by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 8
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
2. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1982).
3. E.g., Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 416 F. Supp. 248, 263 (N.D. Miss.
1976), rev'd and vacated in part, af'd in part, 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 835 (1978); Liss v. School Dist., 396 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 1975)
(mem.), vacated and remanded per curiam, 548 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1977); Zichy v.
City of Philadelphia, 392 F. Supp. 338, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd mem. and
remanded, 559 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1977); Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ.,
390 F. Supp. 784, 787-88 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Farkas v. South Western City School
Dist., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 288, 289 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d
1400 (6th Cir. 1974); Vineyard v. Hollister Elementary School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580,
583 (N.D. Cal. 1974); see H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 [hereinafter
cited as House Report], reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4750,
and in Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, at 148 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Legis. Hist.].
4. See Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 434 U.S.
136 (1977); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975),
vacated mem., 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th
Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); Communications Workers of Am. v. AT&T
Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated mem., 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 424 U.S.
737 (1976).
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Electric Co. v. Gilbert,5 the Supreme Court ruled that discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy was beyond the protection afforded by Title
VII's sex discrimination prohibition. The Court permitted an em-
ployer to exclude pregnancy-related disabilities from an employee
non-occupational sickness and accident benefit plan. 6
In response to the Gilbert decision, Congress passed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA),7 an amendment to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy." The PDA redefines sex discrimination under Title VII to
include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related
medical conditions." The PDA clearly precludes an employer from
excluding coverage of an employee's pregnancy-related conditions
from an otherwise comprehensive medical insurance plan. 0 If an
5. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
6. Id. at 145-46.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. 111978). The text of the PDA provides:
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work, and nothing in section 200e-2(h) of this title shall be
interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection shall not require an em-
ployer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where the
life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or
except where medical complications have arisen from an abortion: Pro-
vided, That nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing
abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to
abortion.
8. EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.
1982) ("PDA was passed in response to the Gilbert decision."); accord Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 450 ("The Supreme Court's
decision in Gilbert, of course, triggered enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act."), affd per curiam en banc, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411); EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539
F. Supp. 153, 156 (E.D. Mo. 1982) ("It is clear that Congress [in enacting the PDA]
was most concerned with overturning the specific result in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert .... "); United Teachers v. Board of Educ., 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
32,759, at 25,562 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("The PDA was a Congressional response to...
Gilbert."); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141, 1142 (N.D. Ill.
1981) ("The amendment aimed to rectify the Gilbert case .... "); 123 Cong. Rec.
29,663 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Mathias); 123 Cong. Rec. 29,650 (1977) (remarks of
Sen. Hatch); see House Report, supra note 3, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 4751, and in Legis. Hist. at 148; S. Rep. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report], reprinted in Legis. Hist., supra note 3, at
40.
9. See supra note 7.
10. House Report, supra note 3, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 4754, and in Legis. Hist. at 152; Senate Report, supra note 8, at 5, reprinted
in Legis. Hist. at 42.
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employer chooses to extend coverage to the spouses of employees,
however, it remains unclear whether she may refuse to cover spouse's
pregnancy-related conditions.
Two federal courts of appeals confronted this issue in 1982. In
EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.," the Ninth Circuit held
that a medical insurance plan covering all medical expenses of
spouses, except costs related to pregnancy, is permissible under Title
VII [hereinafter such plans will be referred to as spousal exclusion
plans]. The court posited that the PDA, while prohibiting pregnancy-
based discrimination against employees, left undisturbed Gilbert's
reasoning that such discrimination is not sex-based as applied to
spouses of employees. 12 Conversely, the Fourth Circuit, in Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,13 concluded that the
PDA rejected the rationale of Gilbert.14 The court then interpreted
Title VII's ban on gender-based differentials in compensation to pro-
hibit spousal exclusion plans.15
The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether spousal exclusion
plans are valid under Title VII.1' An examination of the language of
the PDA and the history surrounding its enactment reveals that Con-
gress did not intend to prohibit spousal exclusion plans under the
PDA. Rather, Congress left this issue for judicial resolution consistent
with pre-PDA Title VII principles. This Note contends, however, that
Congress did intend to reject Gilbert's reasoning that discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy is not gender based within the meaning of
Title VII. In addition, this Note argues that with a spousal exclusion
plan, medical insurance benefits are more valuable to female employ-
ees than to male employees. As a result, such plans transgress Title
VII's ban on gender-based differentials in compensation.
I. RECENT COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PDA
Courts construing the PDA have issued varied interpretations of the
extent to which the PDA modified the Title VII principles embodied
11. 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'g, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1209
(N.D. Cal. 1981).
12. See id. at 1246-47.
13. 667 F.2d 448, aff'd per curiam en banc, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), rev'g,
510 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Va. 1981), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Dec. 7,
1982) (No. 82-411). Three federal district courts, aside from those in Newport News
and Lockheed, have addressed the validity of a spousal exclusion plan. See EEOC v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (not violative of Title VII);
United Teachers v. Board of Educ., 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,759 (C.D. Cal.
1982) (violative of Title VII); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (not violative of Title VII).
14. 667 F.2d at 451.
15. Id.
16. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 51 U.S.L.W. 3442
(U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411), granting cert. to 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982).
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in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.17 The Supreme Court ruled in
Gilbert that an employer could exclude coverage of pregnancy-related
conditions from an employee disability insurance plan.' 8 Gilbert ap-
plied principles announced earlier in Geduldig v. Aiello,'9 in which a
state statutory disability benefit program containing pregnancy-re-
lated classifications withstood scrutiny under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 20
According to the Gilbert Court, pregnancy classifications divide
potential beneficiaries into two groups: pregnant women and non-
pregnant people. While the former group contains only women, the
latter group contains members of both sexes. Because women are
members of both groups, reasoned the Court, women as a class are not
being discriminated against in the allocation of benefits. 21 Thus, ap-
plying the Geduldig rationale, "[t]here is no risk from which men are
protected and women are not . . . [and] no risk from which women
are protected and men are not .... "22 Therefore, there is no evi-
dence that the compensation package is worth more to men than to
women.
2 3
In EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,2 4 the Ninth Circuit
read the PDA as an expression of Congress' intent to carve out a
narrow exception to the general rule, announced in Gilbert, that
pregnancy-related classifications are not gender based within the
meaning of Title VII. 25 In ruling on the validity of spousal exclusion
17. Compare Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d
448, 451 (rejecting Gilbert and concluding that males receive less compensation than
females under spousal exclusion plans), aff'd per curiam en banc, 682 F.2d 113 (4th
Cir. (1982)), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411) with
EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1982)
(relying on Gilbert) and EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153, 158-59
(E.D. Mo. 1982) (same) and EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141,
1142-44 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same).
18. 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976).
19. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
20. Id. at 496-97.
21. 429 U.S. at 135 (citing approvingly Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97
n.20 (1974)). For a critical analysis of Gilbert, see Comment, Differential Treatment
of Pregnancy in Employment: The Impact of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert and
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 717 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Differential Treatment]; Note Income Protection For Pregnant Workers, 26 Drake
L. Rev. 389 (1976-1977); Note, Denying Maternity Benefits Is Not Sex Discrimina-
tion Under Title VII, 28 Mercer L. Rev. 977 (1976-1977); 8 Cum. L. Rev. 271
(1978); 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1202 (1977); 6 U. Bait. L. Rev. 313 (1977).
22. 429 U.S. at 138 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
23. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976).
24. EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982).
25. Id. at 1245-46. The court premised its narrow reading of the PDA on the
language of the Senate report. Id. (construing Senate Report, supra note 8, at 5-6,
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plans, the Ninth Circuit read Gilbert and Geduldig to stand for the
proposition that discrimination is gender based only when the "line
between the favored and disfavored groups [is] drawn strictly on lines
of gender: male versus female. 26 The pregnancy classification em-
bodied in a spousal exclusion plan does not draw such a line. There-
fore, the Lockheed court held that such a plan does not violate Title
VII.2 7
reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 42-43). The committee stated, in its discussion of benefits
for employees' dependents, that the PDA is not intended to "alter the basic principles
of title VII" regarding sex discrimination. Id. There is further support in the legisla-
tive history for the court's narrow interpretation. See House Report, supra note 3, at
3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4751, and in Legis. Hist. at 149
(the PDA will "reflect no new legislative mandate of the Congress nor effect changes
in practices"); 124 Cong. Rec. 21,435 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins) ("This
legislation reflects no new legislative mandate of the Congress nor effects changes in
practices beyond those intended by title VII. . . [it takes a] narrow approach.");
123 Cong. Rec. 29,644 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (PDA is "narrowly
drawn"); 123 Cong. Rec. 29,387 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("This legislation
does not represent a new initiative in employment discrimination law").
26. 680 F.2d at 1246. The notion that discrimination must affect all women or
all men in order to be unlawful is contrary to the theory of sex-plus discrimination.
See generally B. Schlei and P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 337
(1976) (sex-plus discrimination is disparate treatment of a male or female subclass). A
sex-plus problem arises when an employer adds a condition to the employment
criteria which applies to only one sex. For example, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S 542 (1971), the employer's workforce was primarily comprised of
women. Nevertheless, he violated Title VII by refusing to consider hiring women
with pre-school-age children while hiring similarly situated men with pre-school-age
children. Id. at 544. Similarly, in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971), the employer violated Title VII by applying
a no-marriage rule to female stewardesses, though not applying the rule to any other
female or male employees. Id. at 1198; see Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing
Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1975) (en bane) (proscription of sex-plus discrimi-
nation under Title VII has a legislative and jurisprudential underpinning).
27. 680 F.2d at 1246-47.
One facially persuasive argument in support of the Ninth Circuit's position in-
volves the costs of extending coverage to the pregnancy-related conditions of employ-
ees' spouses. A substantial portion of the hearings in the House and the Senate were
devoted to calculations of the cost to employers of complying with the PDA. See
generally Legislation to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings
on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor (Parts I and 2), 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; Discrimination on the Basis of Preg-
nancy: Hearings on S.. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hear-
ings]. Among those predictions, all but two based their estimates on the birthrate of
working women rather than on the birthrate of the total population. See id. at 579-
81 (statistics of Department of Labor); id. at 424, 431 (statistics of the American
Council on Life Insurance); House Hearings (Part 1), supra, at 180-82 (statistics of
Department of Labor); id. at 94, 97, 101-03 (statistics of American Council on Life
Insurance). Employers are likely to incur a substantial cost in extending medical
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In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,28 how-
ever, the Fourth Circuit adopted a broader reading of the PDA. The
court recognized that during consideration of the PDA, Congress
refused to decide whether spousal exclusion plans were valid under
Title VII. 29 Nevertheless, the court held that the language of the PDA
manifests a congressional intent to equate pregnancy-related and gen-
der-based classifications under Title VII, 30 an interpretation that dis-
credits the underpinnings of the Gilbert decision. 31 In the legal vac-
insurance coverage of pregnancy-related conditions to spouses of male employees. See
44 Fed. Reg. 23,804-05 (1979); Smith and Haverman, Spouses' Pregnancy Benefits
Rights Unresolved, Wash. Legal Times, Apr. 19, 1982 at 15, 18; Note, The Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and the EEOC Guidelines: A Return to "Great
Deference'?, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 735, 755 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Great Defer-
ence]; see also Senate Hearings, supra, at 579 (statistics of Department of Labor) (the
fertility rate of non-working women far exceeds the fertility rate of working women).
Supporters of the Ninth Circuit's position suggest that Congress would not have
placed such a burden on employers based solely on cost estimates limited to working
women. See Brief for Appellee at 32, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, aff'd per curiam en banc, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411).
This position has added weight in view of the Supreme Court's demonstrated
sensitivity to costs in evaluating pregnancy-related classifications in employee benefit
plans. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 130-31 (1976) (discussing cost
implications of disallowing pregnancy-related classifications); Geduldig v. Aiello,
417 U.S. 484, 493-96 (1974) (same). Many commentators have interpreted Gilbert
and Geduldig as establishing a cost-justification defense to pregnancy discrimination.
See, e.g., Comment, Pregnancy Disability Benefits and Title VII: Pregnancy Does
Not Involve Sex?, 29 Baylor L. Rev. 257, 277 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Pregnancy
Disability Benefits]; Note, Sex Discrimination-Court Narrows Gilbert-Some Preg-
nancy Discrimination Is Sex Related, 27 Buffalo L. Rev. 295, 317-18 (1978) [herein-
after cited as Court Narrows Gilbert]; 24 Loy. L. Rev. 290, 300 (1978); 6 U. Balt. L.
Rev. 313, 332 (1977).
This analysis, however, is weakened by the conclusion of the House and Senate
committees that no reliable cost estimate was possible regarding the health insurance
costs of enacting the PDA. See House Report, supra note 3, at 10, reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4758, and in Legis. Hist. at 155; Senate Report,
supra note 8, at 10, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 47. Nevertheless, both committees
supported extension of PDA coverage to medical insurance plans because "even a
very high cost could not justify continuation of the policy against pregnant women."
Id. at 11, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 48. Moreover, Congress and the EEOC have
specifically rejected the cost-justification defense to sex discrimination under Title
VII. See 109 Cong. Rec. 9217 (1963) (Congress rejected cost differential defense
amendment to Title VII); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1982). Furthermore, since flirting
with the cost defense in Gilbert, the Court has denied the existence of such a defense
under Title VII. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 717 n.32 (1978).
28. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 451,
aff'd per curiam en banc, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3442 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
1983]
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uum left by the demise of Gilbert, the court held that "[s]ince the
company's health insurance plan contains a distinction based on preg-
nancy that results in less complete medical coverage for male employ-
ees with spouses than for female employees with spouses, it is imper-
missible under [Title VII]." 32
The EEOC's interpretation of Title VII supports the Fourth Cir-
cuit's position. Immediately after enactment of the PDA, the EEOC
issued revised Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, with an
appendix of Questions and Answers Concerning the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act.33 One answer states that when an employer's insur-
ance program covers the medical expenses of spouses of female em-
ployees, the plan must provide equivalent coverage for the medical
expenses of spouses of male employees, including those costs arising
from pregnancy-related conditions. 34 Clearly, the EEOC gleaned
from the PDA a congressional intent to reject the reasoning behind
Gilbert.35 As a contemporaneous interpretation by the agency de-
signed to administer the PDA, the Commission's ruling should be
afforded great deference by courts.36
Despite the EEOC's interpretation, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
have reached opposite conclusions. In order to determine the proper
32. Id.
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 & app. (1982).
34. Id. app. Question 21 and its corresponding answer provide:
21. Q. Must an employer provide health insurance coverage for the medical
expenses of pregnancy-related conditions of the spouses of male employees?
Of the dependents of all employees?
A. Where an employer provides no coverage for dependents, the em-
ployer is not required to institute such coverage. However, if an employer's
insurance program covers the medical expenses of spouses of female employ-
ees, then it must equally cover the medical expenses of spouses of male
employees, including those arising from pregnancy-related conditions.
But the insurance does not have to cover the pregnancy-related conditions
of other dependents as long as it excludes the pregnancy-related conditions
of the dependents of male and female employees equally.
Id.
35. The EEOC premised its decision on Title VII's prohibition of sex-based
differentials in compensation. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,804 (1979). The determination was
grounded, however, on the assumption that the PDA eviscerated the reasoning of
Gilbert. If the EEOC had considered Gilbert vital after the enactment of the PDA,
pregnancy discrimination would still be permissible and the equal compensation
issue would not even have been discussed.
36. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981);
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168,
192 (1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1964); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v.
International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
The theory behind giving contemporaneous interpretations added deference is that
when the interpretation is made, the legislative intent is fresh in the administrator's
mind. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 195-96 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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scope of the PDA, therefore, attention must turn to the language of
the Act and the legislative history that preceded its enactment.
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF THE PDA
A. The Language
The first point of inquiry in determining the meaning and scope of a
statute should be its language.37 If the language's meaning is clear,
then the sole function of the court is to apply the law according to its
terms.3 8 The language of the PDA, however, is not amenable to
singular interpretation.
The PDA amended the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII
to provide:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work .... 39
In Lockheed, the Ninth Circuit read this language as limiting Title
VII protection to female employees. 40 The court, to effect its interpre-
tation of Title VII, replaced the word "sex" with the phrase "preg-
nancy, childbirth or related medical conditions" as required by the
PDA. Thus, the court interpreted Title VII to provide that "it shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 'discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation . . . because
of such individual's ... pregnancy, childbirth or related medical
conditions.' "41 Such a phrase, reasoned the court, "can hardly be
read to apply to male employees. ' 42 The court concluded that the
PDA's references to "employment-related purposes" and "similar in
their ability or inability to work" simply corroborated the court's view
that Congress intended the PDA to apply strictly to employees.43
37. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 695 (1980). No student of law should forget the memorable command of Justice
Frankfurter: "(1) Read the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statute!"
H. Friendly, Benchmarks 202 (1967).
38. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978).
40. EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.
1982).
41. Id. at 1245 (emphasis in original) (paraphrasing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1981)).
42. 680 F.2d at 1245.
43. Id.
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In Newport News, the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite conclu-
sion. The court reasoned that because the PDA defines "on the basis of
pregnancy" to mean "because of sex," an employer's classification on
the basis of pregnancy falls within Title VII's sex discrimination prohi-
bition. 44 Similarly, the court attached importance to Congress' use of
the term "persons" in referring to a beneficiary's ability or inability to
work.45 If Congress had intended to restrict protection to pregnant
employees, reasoned the court, the statute would have referred to
"employees" rather than "persons."' 46
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit's analysis turned to a discussion
of whether this classification resulted in a sex-based differential in
compensation. 47 The Court found it significant that the statute or-
dered equal treatment of women "for all employment-related pur-
poses." ' 48 Medical insurance for spouses is as related to employment as
insurance for the employee himself;49 spousal benefits are not a gratui-
tous gesture, but rather they are part of an employee's compensation
package. 50
The ability of these two courts to articulate two contrary, yet
plausible, interpretations of the same statutory language indicates
that the indisputable intent of Congress, in passing the PDA, cannot
be ascertained from the statutory language alone. 51 Justice Blackmun
recently declared that "where alternative meanings of Congress'
words are plausible, we should not close our eyes to those alternatives
through a strong-armed invocation of the plain-meaning rule."52
Thus, with respect to the PDA, analysis must include an examination
of the legislative history.
44. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 450,
aff'd per curiam en banc, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3442 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411).
45. Id. at 451.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 450.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 451.
51. Words are often not susceptible to a common understanding. See Mere, The
Meaninglessness of the Plain Meaning Rule, 4 U. Dayton L. Rev. 31 (1979); Miller,
Statutory Language and the Purposive Use of Ambiguity, 42 Va. L. Rev. 23 (1956).
As a result, courts often have difficulty interpreting statutes. See United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 217 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 828 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). Silver involved statutory construction of the filing requirements under Title
VII. Significantly, the Court examined the legislative history although the language
of the statute was unambiguous as it applied to the issue. The Court explained that
the "basic policy [of eliminating discriminatory employment practices] must inform
construction of [Title VII]." Id. at 818; see County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S.
161, 198 n.10 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Rather than 'make a fortress out of
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B. The Legislative History
Congress' intent in enacting the PDA can be determined only by
examining the reports of the committees that considered the PDA and
the remarks made by individual legislators during the course of com-
mittee hearings and floor debates. The legislative history indicates
that although Congress did not specifically intend to prohibit spousal
exclusion plans under the PDA, it did intend to reject the reasoning of
Gilbert.
1. The Status of Spousal Exclusion Plans
In examining the legislative history of the PDA, "it must be remem-
bered that the basic purpose of the bill is to protect women employ-
ees." 53 This legislative purpose is evidenced by repeated references to
protecting "pregnant workers" and "working women" throughout the
legislative history.5 4 On the other hand, the legislative materials reveal
minimal consideration of the status of dependents.
The most persuasive indication of congressional intent emanates
from the report of the Senate Human Resources Committee. 55 The
committee stated:
Questions were raised in the committee's deliberations regarding
how this bill would affect medical coverage for dependents of
employees, as opposed to employees themselves .... [T]he ques-
tion in regard to dependents' benefits would be determined on the
basis of existing title VII principles.56
After providing a few examples of programs that would be unlawful
under the PDA, the committee stated:
On the other hand, the question of whether an employer who does
cover dependents ... may exclude conditions related to pregnancy
from that coverage is a different matter. Presumably because plans
which provide comprehensive medical coverage for spouses of
the dictionary,' Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (CA 2), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404
(1945), the Court should instead attempt to implement the legislative intent of
Congress.").
53. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 5, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 42; accord
EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982).
54. EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153, 156 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
55. In examining legislative history, courts have traditionally found the report of
the committee that drafts and considers the law to be a highly persuasive indicator of
congressional intent. 2A C.D. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 48.06, at
203 (1975). The House Committee on Education and Labor did not discuss spousal
exclusion plans in its review of medical benefits under the PDA. See House Report,
supra note 3, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4754, and in
Legis. Hist. at 152.
56. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 5-6, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 42-43.
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women employees but not spouses of male employees are rare, we
are not aware of any title VII litigation concerning such plans. It is
certainly not this committee's desire to encourage the institution of
such plans. If such plans should be instituted in the future, the
question would remain whether, under title VII, the affected em-
ployees were discriminated against on the basis of their sex as
regards the extent of coverage for their dependents.5 7
Though the committee expressed disapproval of spousal exclusion
plans, disapproval is not tantamount to prohibition. The committee
described two types of medical insurance schemes that it declared
would be per se invalid under the PDA;5 a spousal exclusion plan was
not one of them. Thus, the Senate Human Resources Committee did
not prohibit spousal exclusion plans in the bill it sent to the Senate
floor.5 9
57. Id. at 6, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 43.
58. The committee stated that the PDA prohibits an employer from offering a
medical insurance plan that provides maternity coverage to wives of employees but
not to women employees. The committee also barred an employer from offering a
plan that requires women employees to buy coverage for their dependents, even if
they have no dependents, in order to receive coverage for their own pregnancy-
related expenses. Id.
59. In concluding that Congress did not intend to prohibit spousal exclusion
plans under the PDA, two federal district courts relied on a statement by Senator
Williams, the floor manager and principal sponsor of the bill, and inexplicably
ignored the committee report. See EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153,
156-57 (E.D. Mo. 1982); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141,
1144 (N.D. Il1. 1981). Courts generally accord great deference to statements made by
the chairman of the committee responsible for a piece of legislation, particularly if he
is the principal sponsor and floor manager of a bill, like Senator Williams. North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1920-21 (1982); FEA v. Algonquin
SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976); National Woodwork Mfr. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U.S. 612, 640 (1967); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 377
U.S. 58, 66 (1964); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 n.22 (1956);
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951). But see
City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 714 (1978)
(rejecting interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by its floor manager and
principal sponsor). But reliance in this case is misplaced. The two courts failed to
recognize the distinction between disability benefits (also known as income mainte-
nance plans) and medical insurance benefits. The former benefits provide an income,
based on a worker's salary, for an employee who is unable to work because of a non-
occupational disease or disability. Because an employer would never agree to pay the
salary of any worker but her own, such plans apply only to employees. Medical
insurance plans, on the other hand, may apply to employees or their dependents
because such programs compensate their beneficiaries for medical expenses. The
report of the Senate committee clearly draws this distinction. In its discussion of
disability benefits, the report refers only to employees. However, in a separate
section on medical insurance, the report discusses employees and their spouses.
Senate Report, supra note 8, at 4-6, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 41-43; see House
Report, supra note 3, at 5-6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4753-
54, and in Legis. Hist. at 151-52 (same breakdown by sections).
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Although individual legislators disagreed with the committee's deci-
sion, 60 the committee reports have greater probative value than the
remarks of individual members of Congress."' Courts should therefore
assess the validity of spousal exclusion plans, as the committee di-
rected, under "existing title VII principles." 62 Disagreement has
arisen, however, over what principles underlie Title VII.6 3 If Gilbert
60. Representative Weiss said that it was his "impression that the employer was
to cover the dependents of the employees." House Hearings (Part 1), supra note 27, at
188. Representative Sarasin responded to Representative Weiss' statement by saying:
"I don't see how you can read the bill any other way." Id.
The remarks of Representatives Weiss and Sarasin, however, were made in the
course of a colloquy memorable only for its participants' confusion between disability
benefits and medical insurance benefits. See id. at 187-88. As a result, courts have
accorded no weight to these remarks. The Ninth Circuit and two federal district
courts have dismissed them as strictly the speakers' personal opinions which are
unrepresentative of congressional intent. EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,
680 F.2d 1243, 1245-46 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F.
Supp. 153, 158 n.4 (E.D. Mo. 1982); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F.
Supp. 1141, 1144 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The Fourth Circuit, despite the support these
statements lend its decision, chose not even to mention the remarks. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 451, aff'd per curiam en
banc, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Dec. 7,
1982) (No. 82-411).
61. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1932 n.l1 (1982) (Powell,
J., dissenting) ("The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of
the responsible committees."); id. n. 12 ("like most floor debates, the oral statements
of Senators must be viewed with skepticism even when not ambiguous"); Zuber v.
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186-87 (1969) ("Floor debates reflect at best the understanding
of individual Congressmen. It would take extensive and thoughtful debate to detract
from the plain thrust of a committee repgrt."); see Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v.
Federal Energy Admin., 542 F.2d 69, 74 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1976); see also 2A
C.D. Sands, supra note 55, § 48.06, at 203 (persuasiveness of committee report); id. §
48.15, at 222 (lesser value of statements by co-sponsors during debate). Even the
unambiguous remarks of individual, albeit influential, legislators made during the
course of debate may not be controlling. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102
S. Ct. 1912, 1920-21 (1982); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 118 (1980); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979).
62. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 6, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 43.
63. See supra note 17. During floor debate, two Senators posited that spousal
exclusion plans were invalid under pre-PDA Title VII principles. Senator Bayh, a co-
sponsor of the PDA, said "I feel that the history of sex discrimination cases ... will
require that if companies choose to provide full coverage to the dependents of their
female employees, then they must provide such complete coverage to the dependents
of their male employees." 123 Cong. Rec. 29,642 (1977). Similarly, Senator Cran-
ston, also a co-sponsor of the PDA, acknowledged that the Senate Committee had not
settled the issue of whether spousal exclusion plans are valid, but he went on to state:
"I would like to express for the record my own view that such a [spousal exclusion]
plan would indeed be discriminatory, and would be prohibited by the title VII sex
discrimination ban." 123 Cong. Rec. 29,663 (1977). The Fourth Circuit relied on
these statements to support its holding in Newport News. Newport News Shipbuild-
ing & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 451, aff'd per curiam en banc, 682
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remains vital in the wake of the PDA, discrimination on the basis of
the pregnancy-related condition of an employee's spouse is permissi-
ble 4.6  However, the legislative history of the PDA, and two post-
Gilbert Supreme Court decisions, suggest that the reasoning of Gilbert
no longer has precedential value.
2. The Vitality of Gilbert
Although the legislative history offers some support for a narrow
interpretation of the PDA, 65 the weight of evidence bolsters the posi-
tion that the PDA was intended to vitiate the Gilbert rationale.66 For
example, the committee reports sustain a broad reading of the PDA.
The Senate report states:
Even more important than our disagreement with the Gilbert deci-
sion is the fact that the decision threatens to undermine the central
purpose of the sex discrimination prohibitions of title VII .... A
failure to address discrimination based on pregnancy, in fringe
benefits or any other employment practice, would prevent the
elimination of sex discrimination in employment.6 7
F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No.
82-411). However, most courts in considering the validity of spousal exclusion plans
have properly accorded these interpretations little weight. See EEOC v. Lockheed
Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243, 1245 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153, 158 (E.D. Mo. 1982); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply
Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (N.D. Ill. 1981). These statements are the Senators'
opinions of the state of Title VII law prior to the PDA. Because it is the responsibility
of judges, not legislators, to determine the state of the law, these remarks are of little
probative value. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49
(1963) (views of congressmen regarding the meaning of a law passed by a previous
legislature are entitled to little weight). Moreover, both Senators' remarks were
reflections of personal opinion, and, as such, their statements do not constitute a fair
representation of the views of their colleagues. See 2A C.D. Sands, supra note 55, §
48.13, at 217.
64. See EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243, 1246-47 (9th
Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153, 158-59 (E.D. Mo. 1982);
EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141, 1142-43 (N.D. Il. 1981).
65. See supra note 25.
66. See 124 Cong. Rec. 21,436 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Sarasin) (the PDA "would
restore the interpretation of title VII prior to [Gilbert]"); 123 Cong. Rec. 29,655
(1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("[w]hat we are doing is leaving the situation the way
it was before the Supreme Court decided the Gilbert case"); Kirp and Robyn,
Pregnancy, Justice and the Justices, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 947, 948 (1979); Rutherglen,
Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit Plans, 65 Va. L. Rev. 199, 236 (1979); Thomas,
Differential Treatment of Pregnancy in Employee Disability Benefit Programs: Title
VII and Equal Protection Clause Analysis, 60 Or. L. Rev. 249, 250, 263, 270 (1981)-
Legislative Note, Employment Discrimination-"Sex Discrimination" Under Title VII
Includes Differential Treatment of Pregnancy Related Disabilities, 45 Mo. L. Rev.
145, 152-53 (1980); Great Deference, supra note 27, at 741-43.
67. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 3, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 40.
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Similarly, the House report recognizes the "broad social objectives of
Title VII"'6 8 and declares that "narrow interpretations of Title VII
tend to erode our national policy of nondiscrimination in employ-
ment. "6
A broad reading of the PDA is also consistent with the well-estab-
lished principle that when dealing with a humanitarian, remedial
statute, the language should be construed liberally so that the intent of
the legislation is fully realized.7 0 The Supreme Court has often held
that Title VII is such a statute; a broad construction is essential to
effectuate its purposes.71 The scope of Title VII has been interpreted
broadly with regard to the definitions of employers7 2 and employees 73
68. House Report, supra note 3, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 4750, and in Legis. Hist. at 148.
69. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4751, and in
Legis. Hist. at 149. The remarks of several legislators buttress the view that the PDA's
effect on Gilbert should not be construed narrowly. See, e.g., 124 Cong. Rec. 36,819
(1978) (remarks of Sen. Stafford) (the bill is a "great and long overdue advance in the
civil rights of American women"); 124 Cong. Rec. 21,437 (1978) (remarks of Rep.
Green) (the PDA is not only important to working women, but is of "critical impor-
tance to all women in this country"); 123 Cong. Rec. 7541 (1977) (remarks of Sen.
Mathias) (Gilbert must be rejected "not only in its specific application . . .but also
in its potential for erosion of Title VII protection against sex discrimination gener-
ally." Failure to enact the PDA would give employers a "green light for additional
classifications based on pregnancy and other sex-related discriminations as well,
without fear of violating Title VII"); see also Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 1
(remarks of Sen. Williams) (Gilbert "poses a serious threat to antidiscrimination
policies under Title VII"); id. at 168 (remarks of Sen. DeConcini) (the PDA is
important for the "preservation of equitable employment practices, particularly to
women").
70. See, e.g., Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083, 1087-88 (2d Cir. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Miller v. Amusement Enters., 394 F.2d 342, 349
(5th Cir. 1968); E. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes § 239, at 454 (1975); 3
C.D. Sands, supra note 55, § 72.05, at 392 (1973).
71. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1783 (1982); County
of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170, 178 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971). See generally 3 C.D. Sands, supra note 55, § 72.05, at 392 (1973) (Title VII
should be liberally construed).
72. See, e.g., Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1599, 1606 (2d Cir. 1982) (unincorporated association set up by university was
covered by Title VII), petitionfor cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3461 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1982)
(No 82-913); Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 1977)
(two corporations treated as one "employer" under Title VII); EEOC v. Wooster
Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1263 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (unincorporated association
set up by corporation was covered by Title VII). But see Peters v. Wayne State Univ.,
691 F.2d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 1982) (unincorporated association created to administer
employee retirement plan not an employer under Title VII).
73. See, e.g., Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (male private duty nurse); Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446
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subject to the Act. Such expansive interpretations are consistent with
the Supreme Court's ruling that the basic policy of eliminating dis-
criminatory employment practices must inform construction of Title
VII.74 Consequently, interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims
of a remedy should be avoided, absent a "clear congressional man-
date."' 75 In light of this policy, the Senate report could be character-
ized as something less than a clear congressional mandate to deprive
male employees and their spouses of a remedy.
The most persuasive indication of congressional intent to overrule
Gilbert is embodied in Congress' explicit endorsement of the language
found in the Gilbert dissents. Both committees, echoing Justice
Stevens' dissent, recognized that "it is the capacity to become preg-
nant which primarily differentiates the female from the male."' 7
Moreover, the Senate affirmed Justice Brennan's declaration that
"[s]urely it offends common sense to suggest ... that a classification
revolving around pregnancy is not, at the minimum, strongly sex
related. ' 77 The reasoning of the Gilbert majority is difficult to recon-
cile with Congress' explicit adoption of the reasoning set forth by the
Gilbert dissenters.
Furthermore, much of the Gilbert dicta was specifically rejected by
Congress. For example, the Gilbert majority stated that pregnancy is
"significantly different from the typical covered disease or disability;"
it is often "a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition. '78 How-
(3d Cir. 1971) (pensioner); Johnson v. Georgia Hwy. Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122,
1124 (5th Cir. 1969) (discharged worker); Mathis v. Standard Brands Chem. Indus.,
10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 295, 297-98 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (independent contrac-
tor); Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089, 1090-92
(D.N.H. 1974) (driver-trainer of horses); Wilson v. Monsanto Co., 315 F. Supp. 977,
979 (E.D. La. 1970) (applicant). But see Jenkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp.
950, 952 (D. Or. 1977) (self-employed trainee not protected by Title VII); Smith v.
Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 516-19 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (independent
trucker not protected by Title VII), aff'd mem., 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978).
74. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818 (1980).
75. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981); see Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (when congressional
intent is unclear, courts traditionally resolve ambiguities in Title VII "in favor of
those whom the legislation was designed to protect"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080
(1980).
76. House Report, supra note 3, at 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 4750, and in Legis. Hist. at 40 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 162 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
77. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 39 (quoting
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 149 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
Several congressmen explicitly endorsed the dissent during debate on the PDA. See,
e.g., 124 Cong. Rec. 21,436 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Sarasin); 123 Cong. Rec. 29,662
(1977) (remarks of Sen. Cranston); 123 Cong. Rec. 29,388 (1977) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy).
78. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976).
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ever, both committee reports make it clear that pregnancy may not be
considered unique; it must be treated like any other disability. 79 Con-
gress recognized that pregnancy is no more voluntary than the typi-
cally covered disease or disability resulting from the decision to smoke,
drink, ski or play football. Particularly disturbing to many legislators
was the realization that medical plans that excluded coverage of
pregnancy-related conditions typically covered elective medical care
such as vasectomies and cosmetic surgery.80
In addition, another component of the Gilbert analysis has been
substantially criticized. The Court reasoned that if there is no risk
from which one sex is protected that the other is not, the plan will
survive scrutiny under Title VII. 81 The inherent weakness of this
analysis is that many disabilities strike a particular group exclusively.
Under the Court's reasoning, for example, sickle-cell anemia and Tay-
Sachs disease could be excluded from a plan.8 2 Neither Congress nor
the Court, however, would likely permit such an exclusion.8 3
79. House Report, supra note 3, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 4754, and in Legis. Hist. at 152; Senate Report, supra note 8, at 4-5,
reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 41-42.
80. See, e.g., 123 Cong. Rec. 29,662 (1977)(remarks of Sen. Cranston); 123
Cong. Rec. 29,655 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Hatch); 123 Cong. Rec. 29,388 (1977)(re-
marks of Sen. Kennedy); see also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 151
(1976)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. 429 U.S. at 138.
82. Id. at 152 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Differential Treatment, supra
note 21, at 733.
83. See Differential Treatment, supra note 21, at 733; see also 123 Cong. Rec.
10,582 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins) (rejects Gilbert rationale as "contrary to
any sensible approach to what constitutes discrimination").
Under the PDA, pregnancy-related conditions may not be excluded from an other-
wise comprehensive health insurance plan. House Report, supra note 3, at 6, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4754, and in Legis. Hist. at 152;
Senate Report, supra note 8, at 5, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 42. However, two
interesting issues arise. First, if an employer chose to cover just two or three types of
disabilities, could she exclude pregnancy-related conditions from that plan? The
answer is probably yes because an employer is free not to offer any medical insurance
at all. House Report, supra note 3, at 4, 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 4752, 4754, and in Legis. Hist. at 150, 152; Senate Report, supra note 8, at
4, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 41. On the other hand, an employee medical insurance
plan which excludes pregnancy-related conditions along with just a few other condi-
tions not connected to a protected class is unlikely to be permissible. The issue, thus,
is at what point a medical insurance plan is comprehensive enough to become subject
to the PDA. The other issue presented is what other conditions are so linked to a
protected classification that they could not be excluded from an otherwise compre-
hensive insurance scheme. For example, if 90 % of the people victimized by heart
disease are men, could an employer exclude it from her plan without violating Title
VII? Resolution of these issues awaits future litigation.
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In addition to Congress' discontent with the reasoning of Gilbert,
two post-Gilbert Supreme Court decisions suggest that the Gilbert
rationale is no longer acceptable. In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,84 the
Court held that Title VII prohibits an employer from depriving
women of their accumulated seniority because of childbirth related
absences from work. 5 A year later, in City of Los Angeles Depart-
ment of Water & Power v. Manhart,86 the Court invalidated a pen-
sion plan under which female employees contributed more to their
pension fund than their male counterparts, yet received no greater
benefits. 87 Justice Blackmun, concurring in part, found that the dis-
tinction drawn in the pension plan was the same one drawn in the
disability plans in Gilbert and Geduldig-sex-based.8 Therefore, he
declared that Manhart necessarily retreats from these two decisions. 89
The judicial retreat from Gilbert, coupled with Congress' explicit
rejection of the decision, indicates that all pregnancy-based classifica-
tions should be considered sex-based within the meaning of Title VII.
Nevertheless, Title VII does not prohibit sex-based classifications un-
less such classifications operate to deny benefits or advancement op-
portunities to employees of one sex that are granted to employees of
the opposite sex. 90 The controversy surrounding spousal exclusion
plans centers on the employee benefit aspect of the employment rela-
tionship. Thus, it must be determined whether such plans provide
medical insurance benefits that are more valuable to female employ-
ees than to male employees.
III. VALUATION OF BENEFITS
Congress has expressed a firm national commitment to eradicate
sex-based differentials in employment. 91 The area that has received
the most attention is discrimination in compensation. The Equal Pay
Act of 196392 mandated that employers must provide equal pay for
84. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
85. Id. at 142 & n.4; see Court Narrows Gilbert, supra note 27, at 295.
86. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
87. Id. at 704, 712-13. The employer's asserted justification for this differential
treatment was that women, as a class, live longer than men. Id. at 712. Therefore, in
demanding larger pension fund contributions from his female employees, the em-
ployer was passing on the higher costs of providing retirement benefits to his female
employees. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
88. 435 U.S. at 725.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 1.
91. Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Silbowitz v. Secretary of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 397 F. Supp. 862, 869 (S.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd mem., 430
U.S. 924 (1977).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
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equal work, without resort to sex-based classifications. A year later,
Congress went far beyond the Equal Pay Act, in enacting Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act.93 Title VII states that it is an "unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex." 94
Title VII requires that employees be treated equally without regard
to their gender.0 5 If an employer provides female employees with
93. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 445-46 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a)(1) (1976).
95. Id.; 44 Fed. Reg. 23,804 (1979). In 1964, Congress devoted very little time to
discussing the sex discrimination prohibition in Title VII. See General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976); Polston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 380, 387 (W.D. Ky. 1975). The legislative history reveals
that the gender classification was added to the Act by southern conservatives in an
effort to defeat the bill. This attempt to sabotage the Act is evidenced by the voting
patterns of the respective camps. All ten members of the House of Representatives
voicing opposition to the amendment adding sex as a protected classification voted
for the Act, while ten of the eleven members who spoke in favor of the amendment
voted against passage of the Act. See Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 877, 879-85 (1967); Comment, Sex
Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 1968 Duke L.J. 671, 676-77. As a result, there is a paucity of legislative
history to guide courts in interpreting the prohibition. Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
The 1972 amendment to the Act markedly altered the status of the sex discrimina-
tion prohibition. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1976)). The amendment
gave Congress the opportunity to drop" sex as a protected classification. Congress'
failure to do so suggests that it approved of the provisions as they had been enacted.
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Pregnancy Disability Benefits, supra note 27, at 265;
Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex
Discrimination, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 441, 464 (1975); 21 How. L.J. 298, 299 (1978);
cf. EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981) (similar
interpretation of congressional intent applied to Title VII filing requirements).
Thus, courts today treat sex discrimination under Title VII in the same manner as
they treat discrimination on the basis of race, religion or national origin. See Polston
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 380, 387 (W.D. Ky.
1975). The Supreme Court recently declared that Title VII was intended to "strike at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women." City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971)). The Act embodies an "unequivocal requirement of equal treatment," Silbo-
witz v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 397 F. Supp. 862, 869 (S.D. Fla.
1975), aff'd mem., 430 U.S. 924 (1977), which "precludes all discrimination on the
basis of sex." Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1043 (4th Cir. 1976)
(emphasis in original). In enacting Title VII, Congress sought to put men and women
on "equal footing" in the job market, Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219,
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insurance that covers the costs of all of the medical conditions of their
spouses, but provides male employees with insurance coverage for
only some of the medical conditions-all but pregnancy-related dis-
abilities-of their spouses, then male employees are receiving a less
favorable fringe benefit package.96 Title VII protects males, as well as
females, from sex discrimination.9 7 Courts have extended this protec-
tion to the area of fringe benefits. 98 In Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp.99 the Supreme Court declared that an employer may not have
one employment policy for mothers and another for fathers. 00
Similarly, an employer may not have one compensation policy for
the families of male employees and a different policy for the families
of female employees. 1' 1 Indeed, "essential equality in compensation
for comparable work is at the heart" of Title VII. 10 Compensation,
1225 (9th Cir. 1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th
Cir. 1969), and assure "equality of employment opportunities." McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429 (1971).
96. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 451,
aff'd per curiam en banc, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3442 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411); 44 Fed. Reg. 23,805 (1979).
97. See, e.g., Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (hospital that refused to refer female patients to a male private duty nurse
violated Title VII); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th
Cir.) (males cannot be precluded from position of flight attendant), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971); cf. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3333
(1982) (state nursing school that admitted only women for credit discriminated
against male applicant under fourteenth amendment); Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (state law that gave mothers, but not fathers, of illegitimate
children the right to veto their adoption violated fourteenth amendment); McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (white employees may allege
race discrimination under Title VII); Board of Regents v. Dawes, 522 F.2d 380, 383
(8th Cir. 1975) (lower minimum salary for male employees violated Equal Pay Act),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976); Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir.)
(white male may allege race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1006 (1975).
98. See, e.g., EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1142 (1st Cir. 1978)
(lower life insurance benefits for males); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559, 561, 570
(2d Cir. 1975) (males may challenge retirement benefit scheme), rev'd on other
grounds, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
99. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
100. Id. at 544; see Vick v. Texas Empl. Comm'n, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
8933, at 5992 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (interpreting Phillips as prohibiting sex-based
distinctions in employment policies).
101. See Silbowitz v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 397 F. Supp. 862,
866-67 (S.D. Fla. 1975), afJ'd mem., 430 U.S. 924 (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 86.56(b)(1)
(1982).
102. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 152 n.6 (1977) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis in original).
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within the meaning of the Act, encompasses all fringe benefits, includ-
ing medical insurance. 103 A plaintiff can establish a Title VII violation
by showing that the fringe benefits made available by an employer are
"worth more to one sex than to the other." 0 4
The relevant measure of the worth of a fringe benefit is the value of
the benefit to the employee rather than the employer's cost of provid-
ing the benefit.10 5 In Manhart, the Supreme Court was confronted
103. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 139 n.17 (1976) (disability
benefits are compensation); Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 563
F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir.) (medical insurance coverage is compensation), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A.,
Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir.) (retirement benefits are a "condition" of employ-
ment), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Willett v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F.
Supp. 631, 636 (W.D. Va. 1977) (medical insurance is compensation), aff'd per
curiam, 569 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1978); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a) (1982) (EEOC guide-
lines define medical insurance as compensation under Title VII); cf. Inland Steel Co.
v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948) (retirement benefits are "wages" within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act), aff'd sub nom. American Com-
munications Ass'n v. NLRB, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
Defining fringe benefits as "compensation" under the Act is logical because they
are of no less interest to an employee than any other part of a compensation package.
Id. In fact, it is not only logical, but critical to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
Fringe benefits account for over one-third of payroll costs in many firms. See
Lindsey, Employe Benefits' Bigger Bite, 69 Nation's Bus. 75 (Dec. 1981); The Grow-
ing Value of Those Fringe Benefits, 91 U.S. News & World Rep. 69 (Dec. 21, 1981).
Failure to oversee the distribution of fringe benefits would give employers unlimited
opportunities to discriminate on unlawful bases.
104. Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 563 F.2d 537, 542 (2d
Cir.) (Mansfield, J., concurring), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 429 U.S.
1033 (1977); accord General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976);
deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1978);
Holden v. H.J. Heinz Co., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 175, 177 (W.D. Pa.
1977).
105. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707-11 (1978) (greater cost to employer of paying pension benefits to women, as
a class, than men does not justify greater contributions to the pension fund from all
individual women); Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1599, 1605-06 (2d Cir. 1982) (illegal to demand equal contribution and give
women pensioners fewer benefits), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S.
Nov. 23, 1982) (No. 82-791); Retired Pub. Employees Assn v. California, 677 F.2d
733, 735 (9th Cir. 1982) (same), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3140 (U.S. Aug.
31, 1982) (No. 82-262); Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred
Annuity, 671 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 205
(1982) (No. 82-52); Taylor v. Franklin Drapery Co., 443 F. Supp. 795, 796-98 (W.D.
Mo. 1978) (greater hospitalization insurance cost for women does not justify less
coverage for women); Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 9,
13-14 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (benefit to employee is relevant measure of value of medical
insurance); Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
50, 58 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (higher cost of sickness and accident insurance for females
does not justify fewer benefits for females); Bernstein and Williams, Title VII and the
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with the task of measuring the value of pension benefits. The em-
ployer deducted greater pension contributions from the paychecks of
female employees than from the checks of male employees. His justifi-
cation was that because women, as a class, live longer than men,
women should pay for the greater benefits they receive. The Court
rejected this cost-justification defense to sex discrimination. 106 It is
Problem of Sex Classifications in Pension Programs, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1203, 1211-
12 (1974); Note, The End of Sex Discrimination in Employer-Operated Pension
Plans: The Challenge of the Manhart Case, 1979 Duke L.J. 682, 703. But see Peters
v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235, 240-41 (6th Cir. 1982) (equal employee contri-
butions, despite unequal periodic benefits, are permissible under Title VII); Kimball,
Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 Am. Bar Found. Research J. 85, 128-29
(cost to employer should be dispositive factor, equal periodic pension benefits dis-
criminate against male employees).
106. 435 U.S. at 716-17. Although the Court denied the existence of a broad cost-
justification defense, it did recognize, in dictum, the possibility of a limited defense,
based on "all of the elements of the employment costs of both men and women." Id.
at 717 n.32 (quoting S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963)). In Women in
City Gov't United v. City of New York, 563 F.2d 537, 541 (2d Cir.), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977), the Second Circuit apparently
permitted a related version of such a defense. The court, while still assessing the
value of the benefit from the perspective of the employee, suggested that the only
relevant measure in an action charging sex-based differentials in compensation is the
value of the entire package of wages and benefits. For example, under this approach
higher life insurance costs for male employees, see EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d
1139, 1142 (1st Cir. 1978), may be offset by lower medical insurance costs because
their wives are not covered for maternity costs. The court reasoned that if an
employer had to equalize each type of compensation for each race, sex, religion or
ethnic group, Title VII would "impose ... an administrative complexity un-
dreamed of by [the Act's] draftsmen." 563 F.2d at 541.
It is doubtful the Court would accept this interpretation. First, although Manhart
mentioned the possibility that a limited cost defense may exist, the Court stated that
it is difficult to find statutory language to support such a defense. City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717 n.32 (1978). Second, the
total package analysis is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's determination that
Title VII prohibits an employer from premising employment policies on class charac-
teristics. The focus of the law is on "fairness to individuals rather than fairness to
classes." Id. at 709; see Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2534 (1982); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969); Delta Air Lines v.
Kramarsky, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1429, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Individual
male employees injured by discriminatory distribution of fringe benefits are entitled
to protection. Their injuries are not redressed just because men, as a class, receive
compensation comparable to that received by women. Cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 102
S. Ct. 2525, 2535 (1982) (simply because an employer ends up with a workforce that
adequately represents blacks, the employer is not immune from Title VII suits for a
particular hiring practice that has an adverse effect on blacks).
Third, the Civil Rights Act was intended to be interpreted broadly so that victims
of discrimination are not deprived of a remedy. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161, 178 (1981). Once an employee establishes that a fringe benefit is meted out
in a discriminatory manner, the employer should bear the burden of proving total
compensation packages are of equal value. It is the employer, rather than the
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impossible, ruled the Court, to predict that any individual woman
will live longer than any individual man. 0 7 Because class characteris-
tics are not shared by every class member, individual risks "may not
be predicted by resort to classifications proscribed by Title VII."'
s08
Therefore, the focus of Title VII protection is the individual em-
ployee.109
That a benefit flows to the spouse of an employee, rather than the
employee himself, does not take spousal coverage outside the scope of
Title VII. Medical insurance for a spouse is a part of an employee's
compensation package."10 As such, it must meet the equal compensa-
tion requirement of Title VII.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal statutes that
provide less fringe benefit protection to spouses of female wage earn-
ers than to spouses of male wage earners discriminate against the
female wage earner. In Frontiero v. Richardson,"' the Court invali-
dated a federal law that granted the families of married servicemen an
increased living allowance while denying the same to married service-
women, absent a showing of spousal dependence." 2 Similarly, in
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 1 3 the Court struck down a social security
provision that made survivors' benefits available to widows but not
widowers." 4 The statute, reasoned the Court, "deprive[s] women of
protection for their families which men receive as a result of their
employment."" 5 The same approach was applied by the Court when
it invalidated a social security provision that allowed widowers to
receive survivors' benefits only upon a showing of dependency on their
deceased wives, while widows received benefits without any such
showing." 6 Indeed, "there is no merit in giving one family less than
another, solely because the covered wage earner" is one sex rather
than the other." 7 Clearly, the Supreme Court's position is that if
employee, who has access to the payroll records and accountants necessary to make
such a showing. Such a standard of proof for an employee would be insurmountable;
it would effectively vitiate any possibility of relief.
107. See 435 U.S. at 710.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 709.
110. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448,
450, aff'd per curiam en banc, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411).
111. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
112. Id. at 690-91.
113. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
114. Id. at 653.
115. Id. at 645; see id. at 654 (Powell, J., concurring).
116. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1977).
117. Silbowitz v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 397 F. Supp. 862, 871
(S.D. Fla. 1975), afJ'd mem., 430 U.S. 924 (1977).
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fringe benefit protection for spouses of wage earners varies with the
sex of the wage earner, the wage earner is the victim of unlawful
discrimination. I's
Although Congress expressly decided that spousal exclusion plans
are not prohibited under the PDA and should be evaluated under
"existing title VII principles," 9 the Senate committee suggested that
the valuation of benefits approach was the principle it intended to
substitute for Gilbert. In addressing the plight of women workers
without pregnancy coverage, the committee adopted the broader
principle that if employees of one sex are obliged to apply their income
to doctor and hospital bills, while employees of the opposite sex need
bear no such expense, the members of the unprotected sex are "obvi-
ously earning less for the same work.' 120 Because spousal exclusion
plans force male employees to bear the cost of medical expenses for
their spouses which their female colleagues do not bear, such plans are
more valuable to female employees. As a result, they violate Title
VII's prohibition against gender-based differentials in compensation.
In concluding that spousal exclusion plans are impermissible under
Title VII, the EEOC, in the appendix to the revised Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, utilized the method above to assess the
value of medical insurance benefits.' 2' The Supreme Court has de-
clared repeatedly that such interpretations are entitled to "great defer-
ence" by courts.12 2 Thus, unless there are "compelling indications that
it is wrong," the Commission's interpretation should be followed. 2 3
118. While Frontiero and its progeny are constitutional decisions, and hence not
controlling in an action brought under Tile VII, the Court has evinced a willingness
to employ constitutional analysis in pregnancy discrimination suits brought under
Title VII. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-40 (1976) (citing with
approval Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)).
119. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 6, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 43.
120. Id. at 5, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 42. Although post-enactment history
cannot be accorded the weight of contemporary legislative history, authoritative
expressions relevant to the issue should be considered. See North Haven Bd. of Educ.
v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1925 (1982) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 687 n.7 (1979)).
121. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,804-05 (1979).
122. E.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
433-34 (1971); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971)
(Marshall, J., concurring); cf. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912,
1932 n.12 (1982) (deference to Department of Education); Volkswagenwerk v.
F.M.C., 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968) (deference to Federal Maritime Commission);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (deference to Labor Department's
Wage and Hour Administrator).
Although the EEOC does not have rule-making authority, it does have the power
to promulgate administrative interpretations of Title VII. General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431
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Yet in practice, courts have not been "reduced to such total abdica-
tion" to the EEOC in interpreting Title VII. 124 In Gilbert, the Su-
preme Court refused to adhere to a 1972 Commission interpretation
that was inconsistent with a pre-1972 Commission guideline and with
prevailing Title VII interpretations by other federal agencies.12 5 More-
over, the Court failed to give deference to the 1972 guideline because
it was not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII.126 Similarly,
the Commission's 1979 method of assessing the value of medical insur-
ance coverage is premised on pre-PDA Title VII principles, 12 7 and
(1975). Evaluating the validity of spousal exclusion plans involves complex economic
and social inquiry. It is just the type of issue Congress intended the EEOC, rather
than the courts, to resolve. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 155 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Deference to the EEOC is based on the court's long standing judgment that an
administrator charged with enforcing a statute is in a better position than a judge to
interpret its meaning. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). As a
result, the Court has ruled that in order to sustain an agency's construction of a
statute, a court need not find the interpretation to be the only reasonable one or the
one the court would have made had it been confronted with the problem. See Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1964); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S.
90, 118 (1946).
123. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 145 n.25 (1979) (quoting Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973) (same).
124. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145 (1976); see Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973).
125. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-45 (1976).
126. Id. See supra note 36.
127. The Commission's 1979 decision to use the valuation of benefits method
described above is premised on an interpretation of pre-PDA Title VII principles. See
44 Fed. Reg. 23,804 (1979). The fifteen-year lapse between enactment of Title VII in
1964 and issuance of answer 21 in 1979 can be explained by the fact that spousal
exclusion plans were virtually unknown prior to congressional approval of the PDA.
Senate Report, supra note 8, at 6, reprinted in Legis. Hist. at 43. Pre-PDA employer-
sponsored health insurance plans typically provided greater coverage of pregnancy
costs for the wives of male employees than for female employees. See, e.g., EEOC
Dec. No. 71-1100, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 272 (1970); EEOC Dec. No. 70-
660, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 590 (1970); EEOC Dec. No. 70-510, 2 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 587 (1970); EEOC Dec. No. 70-495, 2 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 499 (1970). This benefits policy was based on the assumption that
married female employees could depend on their husbands' insurance to cover the
cost of childbirth. On the other hand, wives of male employees were presumed to be
dependent on their husbands to pay such costs. See generally City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) (pre-Title VII
employment policies based on stereotyped impressions about the roles of males and
females).
However, with the enactment of the PDA, employers who offered medical insur-
ance to their employees were no longer free to exclude coverage of their female
employees' pregnancy-related conditions. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Therefore, they sought to trim payroll expenses by cutting out coverage of the
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thus it does not warrant the deference due a contemporaneous inter-
pretation. 128 However, it is not inconsistent with any prior Commis-
sion interpretations12 or with any prevailing interpretations of other
federal agencies. 30 In addition, the thoroughness evident in the for-
mulation of the method lends added credibility to the EEOC's inter-
pretation. 31 Thus, the EEOC's method of assessing the value of bene-
pregnancy-related conditions of spouses of employees. See, e.g., Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(en banc), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1982) (No. 82-411); EEOC
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982); United Teachers v. Board of Educ., 29
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32, 759 (C.D. Cal. 1982); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply
Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Thus, such plans are based on economics,
rather than the romantic paternalism that has traditionally spawned sex discrimina-
tion. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969).
128. See supra note 36.
129. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(d)
(1973); EEOC Dec. No. 70-660, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 590 (1970); EEOC
Dec. No. 70-510, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 587 (1970); cf. EEOC Dec. No. 71-
1100, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 272 (1970) (equal maternity coverage for wives
of male employees and female employees); EEOC Dec. No. 70-495, 2 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 499 (1970) (same). One group has argued that the EEOC has made
inconsistent rulings on this issue because it premises its invalidation of spousal exclu-
sion plans on pre-PDA Title VII principles, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,804 (1979), while, in the
alternative, arguing at trial that this invalidation may also be an interpretation of the
PDA. Brief for Appellant at 18, EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d
1243 (9th Cir. 1982); see Brief for Amicus Curiae, Equal Employment Advisory
Council, at 15, EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir.
1982). However, this argument has not been accepted by any court. The type of
inconsistency which lessens the value of an administrative interpretation exists when
a rule contradicts an earlier interpretation of the same issue, not when a rule supports
two alternative interpretations. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-
43 (1976). In addition, failure to permit the EEOC to argue inconsistent bases for an
interpretation would deprive it of its right to plead inconsistently in federal courts.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
130. In Gilbert, a Labor Department regulation permitting employers to exclude
coverage of pregnancy-related conditions from their disability plans freed the Court
from rigid adherence to a contrary EEOC guideline prohibiting such exclusions.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144-45 (1976). However, this Labor
Department regulation need no longer detain the Court for in Manhart, it was
determined that 29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1977) conflicts with id., § 800.116(d). The
former Labor Department rule rejects a differential cost-justification for sex discrimi-
nation while the latter permits an employer to comply with the Equal Pay Act either
by providing equal benefits or making equal contributions to fringe benefit plans. To
the extent they conflict, the Supreme Court concluded the former was more persua-
sive in mandating equal benefits without respect to employer cost. City of Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 714 n.26.
131. Although the EEOC is not bound to follow the stringent procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act in formulating its guidelines, 30 Fed. Reg. 14,926
(1965), it did adhere to the procedures in developing answer 21. There was a notice
of proposed rule-making, an opportunity for public participation and a delay in the
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fits under a spousal exclusion plan demands greater deference than
was accorded by the Court to the Commission's 1972 guidelines.
CONCLUSION
In enacting the PDA, Congress rejected the notion that discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy is not sex-based within the meaning of
Title VII. The simple theory behind the PDA is that only women
become pregnant; therefore, pregnancy-related classifications of em-
ployees affect only women.
After enactment of the PDA, employers providing medical insur-
ance protection to employees and their spouses could no longer ex-
clude coverage of the pregnancy-related disabilities of women em-
ployees. Thus, they sought to trim costs by excluding coverage of
expenses resulting from the pregnancy-related conditions of spouses.
Such an exclusion appears permissible because male employees do not
become pregnant and their spouses, who are not employees, fall out-
side the protective ambit of Title VII.
This, however, is a tortured construction of the statute. Under
spousal exclusion plans, only male employees are deprived of complete
protection against liability for the medical costs of their spouses.
Moreover, medical insurance coverage of spouses is not a gratuity, but
rather an integral part of an employee's compensation package. Thus,
spousal exclusion plans contain a sex-based classification resulting in
less valuable compensation for male employees than for female em-
ployees. Consequently, spousal exclusion plans transgress the most
basic precept of employment discrimination law: equal pay for equal
work.
Steven Lee Lapidus
effective date o; the guidelines. See 44 Fed. Reg. 13,278-79 (1979) (interim interpre-
tation); id. at 23,804 (final interpretation). In fact, answer 21 was significantly
altered in response to the many comments received on the question of spousal
exclusion plans. See id. (amended to treat spouses and non-spouse dependents differ-
ently). This process reflects a thoroughness of consideration which, the Supreme
Court has declared, warrants great deference. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)); Great Deference, supra note 27, at 758. But see Letter from Senator Richard
Schweiker to EEOC Chair Eleanor Holmes Norton (June 28, 1978) (criticizing
preparation of guidelines), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 142, July 23,
1979.
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